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The Rule of Law. By Tom Bingham. London: Penguin, Allen Lane, 2010. Pp.
ix, 213. Price: $39.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Daniel Schuker.
In 1776, Thomas Paine told readers of Common Sense where to find the
"king" in America. He entreated them to look not among earthly beings, but to
a power above. In America, he explained, "The law is king. For as in absolute
governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and
there ought be no other."' Paine's insight finds its way onto the dust jacket of
Tom Bingham's The Rule of Law. The cover shows a weather-beaten statue of
Justice, scales in her left hand and uplifted sword in her right. But atop her head
sit the sparsely sketched outlines of a gold crown. Where the rule of law
governs, no individual reigns supreme. Justice is the monarch.
Bingham's The Rule of Law is a quest for definition. If the rule of law
carries genuine meaning, it must embrace more than a single principle,
however sweeping. The term has become a watchword for judges and
academics, for politicians and citizens. Liberals exalt it, as do conservatives.
Commentators invoke it in their prescriptions for developing countries and for
industrialized nations.
Bingham held several of the top positions in the British judiciary: he
served as Master of the Rolls, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and
Senior Law Lord of the United Kingdom. By the time of his death in
September 2010, he had achieved a reputation as perhaps the most
distinguished British judge in recent decades. Yet even in the twilight of his
judicial career, he was "not quite sure" what the rule of law meant, nor could he
ascertain whether "all those who used the expression knew what they meant
either, or meant the same thing" (p. vii). And a sovereign cannot govern
through abstraction alone.
The notion of the rule of law reaches back at least to Aristotle, as well as
to the nineteenth-century Oxford professor Albert Venn Dicey, who
traditionally receives credit for coining the phrase. Many scholars have
suggested that the expression has come into such common use for so many
divergent purposes that it almost lacks a coherent meaning. Despite that
ambiguity, the rule of law remains a fundamental precept of good governance.
Bingham challenges his readers to scrutinize a concept that may seem to many
to be second nature-self-evident, even. What does the rule of law mean to us
today-in the United States, the United Kingdom, and across the globe?
. Bingham's book offers a structured, thoughtful, and concise answer to
that sprawling question. He starts with a general definition of the rule of law
and separates it into what he considers its foundational parts. The essence, he
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contends, is this: "[A]ll persons and authorities within the state, whether public
or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly
made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the
courts" (p. 8). Bingham does not consider this description to be comprehensive
or universally applicable in all cases, but he believes that any action departing
from it should require "close consideration and clear justification" (p. 8). For
instance, if a manufacturer sues to restrain a competitor from unlawfully
capitalizing on a trade secret, justice may require that the proceedings take
place outside the public eye. Bingham does not revere legal systems or their
administrators unreservedly. Yet, given the many horrors to which the
twentieth century bore witness, he insists on the indispensability of the rule of
law: "Better to put up with some choleric judges and greedy lawyers" in a
country that seeks to uphold the rule of law than to live under a regime without
compunction for violating it (p. 9). Bingham favors the formulation of John
Locke: "Wherever law ends, tyranny begins." 2
In much of his analysis, Bingham demonstrates clear, crisp thinking about
how to define the rule of law. The book surveys the field briskly and
informatively, and Bingham is rarely at a loss for colorful illustration. He
constructs a robust framework, outlining eight constituent features of the rule of
law. One set of principles centers on procedural protections. The law must be
accessible and, to whatever extent possible, comprehensible and predictable to
the people subject to its enforcement. The people must have access to courts
empowered to resolve civil disputes, and courts must enforce rights and claims
efficiently and affordably. Moreover, the state's procedures for adjudicating
criminal, civil, and administrative cases should be fair. Another set of
principles turns on the exercise of power. The state should constrain the
discretion of judicial decisionmakers and other officials, relying first on set
criteria to resolve legal issues and allowing avenues for legal challenge. The
laws should apply equally to all, and only genuine differences should justify
disparate treatment. In addition, public officials should exercise their powers
fairly and adhere to the laws strictly (Bingham extols judicial review as a
means of enforcing officials' compliance). Bingham also retains a concern for
the content of the laws, and, as discussed below, he emphasizes the protection
of basic human rights. Finally, he argues that the rule of law requires the state
to observe its obligations in international law. Bingham contends that the rule
of law should extend beyond national borders: "The rule of the jungle is no
more tolerable in a big jungle" (p. 112). Each of the constituent parts builds
toward his ultimate proposition that the law reigns above any arm of the state.
Not just any set of laws will do, though. Bingham retains a profound
concern for legal content and basic justice. He espouses a "thick" definition of
the rule of law-the end is not simply the enforcement of laws in itself, but
rather an essentially just legal system (p.67). He rejects thin definitions that
emphasize form over substance. "A state which savagely represses or




persecutes sections of its people," he asserts, does not genuinely follow the rule
of law, even if the state undertakes those heinous acts according to "detailed
laws duly enacted and scrupulously observed" (p. 67). Fundamental human
rights, such as freedom from arbitrary repression and persecution, thus form a
critical component of Bingham's understanding of the rule of law. He
recognizes that countries around the world differ over which rights are
fundamental. Yet he sees those disagreements mainly at the "outer edges" (p.
68). Treading carefully around geopolitical differences, Bingham focuses on
basic understandings "in the UK and developed Western or Westernized
countries elsewhere" (p. 68). He references-in distinctly clinical language
confined to a single sentence-practices in other parts of the world, but stops
short of overt criticism: "In some developing countries a higher premium is put
on economic growth than on the protection of human rights, and in some
Islamic countries little or no protection is given to some rights which are
cherished elsewhere" (p. 68). Perhaps, even in retirement, Bingham thought
discretion the better part of valor. While he favors a thick understanding of the
rule of law, he does not indicate whether he wishes to oblige foreign
governments to adopt his view.
Bingham personally favors the protections outlined in the European
Convention on Human Rights, which the United Kingdom incorporated into its
laws through the Human Rights Act of 1998. He considers the treaty's
guarantees essential to anyone living in "a free democratic society" (p. 68).
Among the provisions he highlights are the rights to life, personal liberty, and
security; fair trials; respect for private and family life, marriage, and protection
of property; access to education; prohibitions against torture, slavery and forced
labor, and punishment without law; freedom of thought, conscience, religion,
expression, assembly, and association; and, finally, equal protection of those
rights and freedoms. Yet Bingham also calls attention to agreements "within a
given society . . . on where the lines are to be drawn at any particular time" (p.
68). Despite his passionate personal belief in thick protection of basic rights
and freedoms, he does not assert their applicability across all states and
societies. Bingham intends his project to be descriptive rather than prescriptive.
But even if he does not seek to impose his own views, he is at times a heartfelt
advocate.
In his effort to define the rule of law, Bingham finds himself caught
between specificity and universality. "[I]n a world divided by differences of
nationality, race, colour, religion and wealth," he writes, the rule of law
constitutes "one of the greatest unifying factors, perhaps the greatest," that
humanity knows (p. 174). Bingham's analysis, however, relies heavily on the
British experience, and for most other support he turns to the United States or
continental Europe. Occasionally, he does so explicitly: in his discussion of
historical landmarks underlying the rule of law, he concedes, "[iln my choice of
milestones I am highly selective and shamelessly Anglocentric" (p. viii).
Bingham's definition of the rule of law, in short, is attuned to Western
societies, and particularly to liberal democracies. He does not delve
substantially into how those elements relate to one another. Perhaps some
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ineluctable tensions exist between Bingham's preference and the international
spectrum of legal cultures. But one cannot expect resolution of such a complex
problem in this compact, albeit incisive, volume.
Bingham's analysis raises many important questions for future inquiry,
and he addresses one such question in his final chapter: can traditional
understandings of the sovereignty of parliament coexist with the rule of law?
The British legal tradition customarily regards Parliament as the country's
supreme, and absolutely sovereign, lawmaking authority. That conception
stands in notable contrast with that of the United States, as well as many other
countries in Europe and elsewhere, whose governmental structures center
instead on a written constitution that stands supreme and mandates some form
of separation of powers. In the United States, the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land, and government officials must swear an oath to support that
document. The rule of law underlies the separation of powers inherent in the
Constitution's structure: the legislature passes generally applicable laws, the
executive enforces them, and the judiciary decides individual cases arising
from those laws. Bingham praises the U.S. Constitution's "enthronement of the
law" (p. 26), but he stops short of explicitly advocating a comparable step for
the United Kingdom. He does not believe judges are independently empowered
to alter the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Nevertheless, he cautiously
suggests that the question is worthy of consideration. The rule of law, after all,
requires some rules that "no government should be free to violate without legal
restraint" (p. 170). Substituting the sovereignty of a written constitution for the
sovereignty of Parliament would mark a profound change. In the final analysis,
Bingham intimates that this is a decision that "should be made only if the
British people, properly informed, choose to make it" (p. 170). From one of the
United Kingdom's preeminent judges of the modern era, his subtle exhortation
is a significant statement: it would definitively place the rule of law above the
rule of a legislative body.
Bingham occasionally steps away from legal, political, and historical
considerations to appeal to his readers' more visceral instincts. He entreats his
readers to see that "aspiration without action is sterile" (p. 173). He invokes a
biblical call to be "doers of the word, and not hearers only"3 (p. 173). Bingham,
however, considers the rule of law a secular principle. Indeed, faith in the rule
of law, Bingham believes, may be "the nearest we are likely to approach to a
universal secular religion" (p. 174). He notes on several occasions that the rule
of law simply makes a place desirable to inhabit.
Ultimately, Bingham's book constitutes an appeal to pursue an ideal. That
purpose stands in some tension with Bingham's aspiration to describe what the
rule of law means, and yet by revealing this tension (incidentally or not) he
sharpens the contours around the precise content of the rule of law. Our
understanding of what the rule of law requires may change over time, and even
faithful governments may encounter difficulties in applying this set of
principles fully and consistently. But it is, as Bingham insists, "an ideal worth
3. Epistle ofJames 1:22.
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striving for" (p. 174). For citizens, scholars, and public servants, that is no
small lesson.
The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security, and International Law. By Michael J.
Glennon. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010. Pp.
xiii, 253. Price: $40.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by James Shih.
Michael J. Glennon's new book, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security,
and International Law, begins with a dauntingly basic question: when and why
does international law work? Glennon, a professor at The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, has written extensively on pragmatism in international
law. In presenting the question as his central inquiry, The Fog of Law
represents Glennon's ambitious effort to synthesize his formidable body of
scholarship on legal pragmatism in order to comprehensively reconceptualize
international law as an institution.
In nine economical chapters, Glennon lays out an answer that is
astonishing in its simplicity. A rule can be considered law-that is, binding
upon states-not when it articulates a greater morality or when states consent to
be bound by it; rather, it works when and only when the benefits of compliance
and the costs of noncompliance are sufficiently high that noncompliance
becomes irrational. Glennon wields this rational choice thesis adroitly in
dismantling the current legal regime governing international security. He
convincingly argues that this regime consists of rules that have failed to meet
the cost-benefit threshold and have therefore fallen into non-law. He
intentionally stops short, however, of outlining a pragmatist legal framework
that could take its place. The Fog of Law thus succeeds as a powerful
deconstructionist critique of the present state of international security law, but
leaves its readers wanting more.
In a pragmatist's world, states decide to follow or to violate a rule mostly,
if not wholly, through a "hard-headed, cold-blooded calculus" (p. 226) of the
economic, political, or military interests such decisions could advance. Glennon
applies this concept to draw a useful distinction between rules on security and
other rules. Rules on matters of "low politics" (p. 37), such as trade,
communication, and transit, often benefit all parties and are therefore effective
in inducing compliance. The "high politics" of security, on the other hand, is
more prone to zero-sum calculations; compliance with a non-aggression rule,
for example, could cost a state its sovereignty. Naturally, fewer states comply,
and international consensus on that rule becomes elusive.
Two institutions of international security discussed at length in this book,
the United Nations and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), exemplify
how such a consensus can be said to have existed in the wake of World War II
and the subsequent nuclear arms race. The specters of nuclear catastrophe and
another global conflict sufficiently aligned the interests of the international
community for the implementation of a supranational legal regime that has
largely remained intact to the present. Glennon suggests, however, that with the
end of the Cold War and the advent of the age of stateless terrorism, the initial
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consensus present at the foundation of these institutions has waned. For
example, he points out repeatedly and with relish that Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, prohibiting a state's use of force against the political or territorial
sovereignty of another state, has been violated between 200 and 680 times (p.
205).
Glennon forcefully argues that the predisposition among international
jurists to treat the oft-violated rules as if they remain binding has undermined
the legitimacy of international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for
example, reiterated this determinist view in Nicaragua v. United States. It held
that a violation in fact strengthens a rule when the state in violation justifies its
action by appealing to exceptions contained in that same rule, whether that
justification is valid or not (p. 92). Glennon rejects this reasoning as wishful
thinking and attributes the deep reluctance to abandon rules to a fallacious
premise shared by two conventional theories-naturalism and positivism-that
underpin the supranational legal structure. Naturalism views morality as the
foundation of international law, positing that states are morally bound by rules
that represent universal principles readily discoverable through logic.
Positivism counters that international law is a set of rules created by states, to
which states commit to be bound through consent. Glennon identifies these
principles' shared faith in the intrinsic power of the law to compel behavior;
that is, both theories rely on the assumption that states will obey rules simply
by the virtue of their status as law. This faith, Glennon argues, has encouraged
international lawmakers to draft and hold onto naYvely prescriptive rules even
when they prove ineffective, thereby divorcing international law from
geopolitical reality. In so doing, they have not only rendered their efforts
practically futile but also have "create[d] the illusion that all international rules
are merely hortatory and can be violated with impunity" (p. 231).
In proposing pragmatism as an alternative to both naturalism and
positivism, Glennon seeks a fundamental redefinition of international law. The
premise that law by itself compels behavior is not always false; rather, it
depends for its validity on the level of coerciveness with which the law can be
enforced. Such a requirement distinguishes the international legal system from
domestic systems. National governments can impose their laws through highly
restrictive means, whereas the international framework relies heavily upon the
pressures of incentives and disincentives applied by peer states. While
individual citizens have no choice but to submit to their national jurisdiction,
states can often choose to opt out of supranational enforcement mechanisms. In
such a system, rules with which the states should comply or agree to comply
simply have no force unless the balance of costs and benefits are such that
states, as rational actors, choose to comply. Consequently, "[w]hat the rules
should be depends entirely upon what the rules can be" (p. 122)-that is, rules
that are unable to impose sufficient costs and impart sufficient benefits to
induce compliance cannot be considered law. This definitional shift, while
possibly not significant to areas of international law that enjoy a high level of
consensus, has enormous ramifications for the international security regime.
Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, Glennon's pragmatism dictates that the
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security regime considerably scale back its scope by discarding disused rules
and retaining only a narrow set of "rules that work" (p. 27). Only in this way
can it remain relevant as an institution that can be considered legal rather than
merely symbolic or aspirational.
Glennon's analysis resonates with the current state of international affairs,
in which salient issues have remained unsolved by the extant legal regime.
With striking concision and precision, Glennon identifies components of the
international security framework that he believes have failed as law: the U.N.
Charter's use-of-force rules, which he emphasizes have "'died"' time and again
from hundreds of violations (p. 61); the NPT, which in his view has failed to
properly incentivize North Korea and perhaps Iran; and the newly adopted
"crime of aggression," which he argues, in empowering the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute individual government officials for
aggression, has "paper[ed] over" a fundamental lack of consensus among states
(p. 171). Glennon repeatedly demonstrates the real-world applicability of his
pragmatist thesis: laws cannot govern if state interests do not or cannot be made
to align. "When international institutions stand in the way," as the United
Nations did between the United States and Iraq and as the NPT did between
North Korea and nuclearization, "international institutions fall by the wayside"
(p. 29).
To the extent that Glennon effectively dismantles the present regime, his
readers are left waiting for affirmative solutions that he acknowledges he does
not have. He forewarns in the introduction that "[a]ll forms of pragmatism
disappoint[, and] ... none tells us 'what we should want to want"' (p. 2), and
he follows through on that disclaimer. Glennon insists that pragmatism
necessarily means there can be no comprehensively articulated alternative.
"[T]he contours of a new international paradigm will gradually emerge," he
assures the reader, only when the international community "feel[s] its way inch
by inch, balance[s] one tradeoff against another[, and] weigh[s] competing
resource needs" (pp. 123-24). To one of the crucial questions of the book-how
to make "rules that work"-Glennon offers little more than Oliver Wendell
Holmes's amorphous words: "Be pragmatic and realistic" (p. 127). In fact,
Glennon readily admits mere pages later that "[w]ithin the legalist paradigm,
the probability is high that there is no solution now for curbing the profligate
use of force" (p. 167).
This admission, as jarring as it is refreshing, logically leads to the
strongest critique of Glennon's pragmatist application to international law. If
what can be properly considered law is no more than a set of codified results of
the political cost-benefit analyses of state actors, pragmatism necessarily
equates law with politics. While one might suppose that this critique would be
anathema to a legal scholar, Glennon anticipates and welcomes this suggestion.
In fact, he tacitly accepts the possibility that law-as-politics is the logical
conclusion of a pragmatic international legal framework. He seems ultimately
hesitant, however, to give his full endorsement to the logic, instead choosing to
stake his position somewhere between the determinism that he has undone and
the relativism that has taken its place. "In very few situations, probably, is
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international law wholly determinative of what a state does," he ventures
tentatively, "[b]ut in very few situations, probably, is international law wholly
irrelevant" (p. 80). Even while allowing that international law in the "high
politics" of state security is "more effect than cause," subject to "cultural,
historical, and power-related factors" (pp. 37-38), he insists that a new
consensus is possible if states proceed cautiously and agnostically. This
hedging begs the very question that the book has sought to answer: how does
one go about drawing the line between pragmatically enforceable rules and
pragmatically unenforceable rules? On this, Glennon's concession that he
cannot give a satisfactory response leaves the reader similarly dissatisfied.
This pragmatic approach to international law has serious implications for
U.S. foreign policy. The Fog of Law can be read as an apology for the Bush
Doctrine, and Glennon indeed spends one chapter defending the necessity of
preemption and another debunking the "crime of aggression"-dismissing it
partly on the grounds that it may be used against U.S. officials who initiate
unilateral aggressive acts. To conclude that the byproduct--or perhaps the
product-of Glennon's analysis is to proffer legitimacy to U.S. actions is not a
criticism, however. Glennon makes clear that his aim, in proposing pragmatism
as the alternative to positivist and naturalist models of international law, is "to
deal with the world as it is, not the world as [diplomats and international
lawyers] would like it to be" (p. 74). In a world in which international law has
been inadequate in neutralizing some of the actors or potentially destructive
means viewed as threats by the United States, the question is not whether U.S.
actions are wrong, but why the existing legal regime fails to adequately address
those threats. Glennon presents a stark choice: international law can hold onto
its theoretical coherence or its real-world relevance, but not both. As the book's
title fittingly suggests, if international lawmakers and state actors want the
latter, they can but bravely wade into the Clausewitzian fog of uncertainty.
Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions. By Joy Gordon.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 359. Price: $39.95
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Adam G. Yoffie.
The bottom line was that the U.S. was prepared to live with the
horrible human impact. We gradually took steps to ameliorate it,
but always slowly and reluctantly.
-A. Peter Burleigh, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
(p. 205)
Joy Gordon, a philosophy professor at Fairfield University, cannot be
accused of obfuscation. She opens her book on the U.N.-imposed sanctions
against Iraq by affirmatively stating: "[T]he U.S.-led invasion and occupation
of Iraq in 2003 will be viewed as one of the catastrophes of contemporary U.S.
foreign policy" (p. 1). Neither mentioning the "Surge," nor the improved
situation for the Kurds, Gordon makes her views quite clear as she focuses on
American and Iraqi casualties. Recent reports that the current political
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stalemate in Iraq may finally be coming to an end, as the nascent coalition
government rallies around Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, indicate that
the local and international policy implications may not be that black and white.4
This book, however, is not about either Bush war in the Persian Gulf. Focusing
instead on economic warfare, Gordon exhorts her readers to remember that the
U.S.-inflicted damage in Iraq did not commence in 2003. "Starting in August
1990, the United States was instrumental in imposing the cruelest sanctions in
the history of international governance" (p. 1).
The exhaustively researched book chronicles the more than decade-long
sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council-at the behest of the United
States-on Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Gordon's book is not just about our
nation's near obsession with Iraq, but also about the role of the United States in
the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. In the post-Cold War era, the United
States was able to dictate the terms of the sanctions and then effectively prevent
their repeal or modification. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security
Council-which was no longer crippled by the American/Russian standoff-
invoked Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and passed Resolution 661. Approved
with thirteen "yes" votes and two abstentions by Cuba and Yemen, Resolution
661 "prohibited the sale or supply of any goods to Iraq. . ." (p. 21).
Although the resolution allowed for medical and humanitarian
exceptions, it paved the way for more than ten years of crippling sanctions by
creating a committee with the power to determine what goods qualified for the
exemptions. Comprised of representatives from the fifteen countries on the
Security Council (the five permanent members and the ten rotating members),
the committee allowed for any single member to deny an exemption. The
United States, actively aided by Great Britain, used the consensus requirement
to block goods ranging from tissue paper and glue to materials necessary for
making shoes and packing food (pp. 62-63). Gordon is correct that the
committee was responsible for carrying out the "blockade," but she is wrong to
paint a picture of a monolithic entity strictly dedicated to denial. Writing in the
Virginia Journal of International Law in the mid- 1 990s, Paul Conlon describes
the committee's evolution to reflect the ever-changing strategy of the Security
Council.5 To be sure, Conlon's more nuanced approach is still fairly critical of
the committee, which he argues did not bother to immerse itself in the details of
how various nations actually implement sanctions by imposing assorted trade
restrictions.6
Conlon was also writing prior to the implementation of the Oil-for-Food
Program, which theoretically afforded Iraq the opportunity to import more
goods, yet in practice led the United States to issue more holds and block
additional contracts. The value of the blocked goods skyrocketed from $147.5
4. See John Leland & Steven Lee Myers, Iraqi Lawmakers Approve an Outline for Power
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, at A16.
5. See Paul Conlon, Lessons from Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a
Source ofSanctions Implementation Authority and Practice, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 633, 636 (1995).
6. Id. at 659 (explaining that the committee "never concem[ed] itself with the fulfillment of
the transaction, except in cases of delivery by air, and therefore [had] no way of knowing how many
cleared export exemptions actually [were] delivered").
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million in 1998 to over $5 billion in May 2002 (p. 63). From the start of the
Oil-for-Food Program through the March 2003 invasion, less than $30 billion
in humanitarian goods were allowed to enter Iraq. Given Iraq's total
population, the paltry figure represented "one-half the per capita income of
Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere" (p. 63).
Although Gordon includes passing references to the damage Saddam
Hussein wreaked on his own people and the endemic corruption within his
government, she does not believe his actions had a significant impact on Iraq's
economy (p. 2). Gordon states: "The real damage to Iraq's economy and
society was not from Hussein's neglect or corruption but from the systemic
impoverishment of the entire nation," effected by "[t]he United States, and to
some extent the UN" (p. 2). The widely reported Oil-for-Food scandal,
moreover, is given its own chapter, but is then largely dismissed as a fairly
insignificant occurrence given the broader economic losses stemming from the
all-encompassing sanctions regime. Toward the end of the book, Gordon goes
so far as to equate the concerns driving the United States with those of Hussein:
For both . . . one critical feature of the decision-making calculus was the same:
it was that humanitarian needs, however extensive, urgent, and certain, were
consistently subordinated to the state's overriding political agenda-for the
United States, to achieve containment or regime change; for Saddam Hussein,
to preserve his power and outlast the containment. (p. 242)
Yet the ideological perspective is not the primary problem with the book.
Gordon is actually a victim of her own success, in that the fact-intensive
research is somewhat overwhelming and difficult to digest. The author best
captures readers' attention when she provides examples of some of the absurd
distinctions made by the United States, such as "agree[ing] to allow black
fabric for nuns but block[ing] white cloth as an input to industry" (p. 62).
Chapter Eight begins the most compelling section of the book, in which
Gordon focuses on Congress's reckless disregard for the humanitarian impact
of the sanctions. Although she notes Congress's obvious underlying concern
with national security, she also manages to paint a damning picture of the
bipartisan callousness that characterized our legislative body throughout the
last decade of the twentieth century. Gordon describes the offices of
Representatives Joseph Hoeffel, Lee Terry, and Robert Menendez as "familiar
with the crisis but unsympathetic" (p. 168). In many instances, however, the
lack of concern for the Iraqi people stemmed from outright ignorance.
Although there were some notable exceptions, such as Senator Russ Feingold
and Representative John Conyers, no one seemed to heed Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan's early call for Congress to think about the moral
implications of the sanctions. Moynihan pointedly explained: "'Food present[s]
a special case. Nothing works like famine"' (p. 143). In spite of Moynihan's
prescient view that noncombatants, especially children, would suffer the brunt
of the punishment (p. 143), the only serious attempt to alleviate the food
shortages in Iraq was spearheaded by a group of elected officials in the
Midwest. Representing the nation's breadbasket, they were eager to provide
their constituents with an additional market for selling crops. Nebraska Senator
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Chuck Hagel was outraged by the widespread imposition of sanctions that cost
the United States "$20 billion in exports, along with 20,000 jobs" (p. 162).
Indiana Senator Richard Lugar even "proposed legislation to require a cost-
benefit analysis before the executive branch could unilaterally impose
sanctions" (p. 161).
As Lugar's proposal intimates, Congress was only part of the problem. It
did not help that the Executive Branch was led by a Democrat who lacked
confidence in his ability to serve as the head of the nation's armed forces.
Fearful of yielding an inch to the Republicans on matters of national security,
an extremely cautious President Clinton was unwilling to brook any discussion
of meaningful sanction reform. Gordon also points out the sad irony that the
crippling sanctions were actually the more dovish option: "[T]he Democratic
leadership saw sanctions as a kind of a buffer" (p. 149). Then-Senator Biden
"privately told congressional critics that if sanctions were removed as an option
the Democrats would be painted into a corner where the only remaining
alternatives for dealing with Iraq would be military ones" (p. 149). Although
the issue was far more complicated than a simple either-or option between
sanctions and attack, American politicians are rarely known for their nuance.
Such impressive research into congressional records, which must have
required combing through countless Congressional Research Service reports,
committee hearings, and floor statements is indicative of the book's fact-
intensive content. The archival research is impressive but the absence of
broader analysis leaves readers wanting. In terms of legal commentary, it is not
until Chapter Eleven-in a twelve-chapter book-that the author even
addresses the intemational legal ramifications of the sanctions and begins to
wrestle with the system's shortcomings. Gordon critiques an international legal
framework that undervalues the right to economic development and lacks the
requisite jurisdictional powers to challenge the United States or the U.N.
Security Council. The Rome Statute, for example, which governs the
International Criminal Court (ICC), only applies to state actors and not to
international governance bodies. The United States, meanwhile, is not even a
party to the statute (p. 219). Gordon also laments the International Court of
Justice's (ICJ) limited powers, which do not afford the Court the right to review
U.N. Security Council decisions (p. 220). At most, the ICJ can offer an
"advisory ruling" on such a decision, and only if the General Assembly or
Security Council asks the Court for one (p. 220). In fact, it is unclear what, if
any, restrictions international law imposes on Security Council resolutions
passed under Chapter VII (p. 221). If international judicial bodies, such as the
ICC and ICJ, are going to have any meaningful impact on the development of
international law, they need to be able to exercise greater oversight of the
international system-particularly of the Security Council.
Gordon reserves her strongest disdain for international law's definition of
genocide and crimes against humanity. Treating the sanctions as a clear
violation of international legal norms, Gordon nonetheless admits that the
policies lacked the requisite mens rea to qualify as genocide or crimes against
humanity. For Gordon, the lack of an explicit legal violation does not lend
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credence to the validity of the sanctions but rather demonstrates the limitations
of international law. The author proceeds to offer an intriguing alternative
based on Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which applies a different standard of
intent. The article's knowledge standard, which does not apply to genocide or
crimes against humanity, requires "'awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events"' (p. 226). Such a
definition would clearly have applied to a United States bereft of malicious
intent but cognizant of collateral damage.
Unfortunately such critiques of the international legal system come too
late in the book, which ends eighteen pages later. To be sure, Gordon offers a
much-needed account of the morally suspect and strategically dubious nature of
widespread economic sanctions. Unable, or perhaps unwilling, to de-link
military sanctions from economic sanctions, the United States and United
Nations contributed to widespread malnutrition and a reprehensibly high child
mortality rate. From a geopolitical standpoint, the ineffectiveness of the
sanctions stemmed from a misguided U.S. policy built on the "irrebuttable
presumption that Saddam Hussein would never comply" (p. 18). Although
Saddam was never able to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of
mass destruction, the United States did not determine that until after invading
the country in 2003. Thus, unless sanctions are intended to pave a path to open
warfare, they failed.
Gordon's vicious critique of the U.S. approach toward Iraq naturally leads
readers to question the legitimacy and effectiveness of any form of narrowly
tailored and targeted restrictions on a nation's ability to import and export
goods. Yet as the specter of a nuclear Iran dominates the headlines-and a new
cadre of American leaders oscillates between the imposition of "smart
sanctions" and the initiation of open warfare-the world must tackle the
ultimate question head on: can sanctions ever really work? And if so, how can
we ensure that they do within the regulated confines of a flawed international
legal system?
Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era. By Vicki C. Jackson. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xviii, 519. Price: $85.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Avery White.
Vicki C. Jackson's book Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational
Era is a comprehensive overview of how national constitutions operate in an
increasingly globalized world. The book serves a dual role as both a descriptive
reader on current theory and issues in comparative constitutionalism and a
normative call for a more internationally engaged American judiciary. Jackson
is largely successful on both counts. She describes current attitudes toward
foreign constitutional law by using a continuum between theories of
"resistance"-opposing the use of foreign law-and "convergence"-
suggesting that domestic judiciaries should be governed by uniform
international law. Between these two poles lies "engagement," a theory that
calls for domestic constitutional courts to examine foreign law although they
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are not bound by it. It is this final approach to foreign law that Jackson
advocates. In doing so, she provides a moderate and persuasive argument for
increased engagement between the U.S. Constitution on the one hand and
foreign and international law on the other.
The first half of Jackson's book is devoted to mapping the prominent
theories of comparative constitutionalism using the framework of resistance,
convergence, and engagement. Theories of resistance suggest to varying
degrees that international and foreign law have no place in domestic
constitutional courts, whether for reasons of constitutional sovereignty,
American exceptionalism, or simple hermeneutical problems of correctly
interpreting foreign bodies of law. Theories of convergence, by contrast, argue
that foreign and international law can and should at times be authoritative over
domestic law, especially in the area of universal human rights. Between these
two poles lie theories of engagement, which argue that national constitutional
courts have a great deal to gain from considering foreign and international law.
Unlike convergence, engagement does not suggest that foreign law should be
authoritative in domestic courts-only that the consideration of foreign sources
of law may elucidate vague constitutional principles and provide valuable
empirical evidence on the results of various policy choices. Jackson makes a
further distinction within engagement itself, between "relational" engagement,
in which the consideration of foreign sources is mandatory for domestic courts,
and "deliberative" engagement, in which the consideration of foreign sources is
optional. It is this last form of engagement that Jackson endorses in the second
half of the book.
According to Jackson, deliberative engagement can provide great benefits
to domestic judiciaries while limiting the costs noted by resistance theorists.
Jackson demonstrates that the use of foreign sources of law "is grounded in
longstanding interpretive practices of the U.S. Court" (p. 103). She points to a
long line of cases, including Plessy v. Ferguson, Miranda v. Arizona, Lawrence
v. Texas, among others, which used foreign sources of law to call into question
traditional definitions of constitutional values. Deliberative engagement can
also provide a "better understanding of one's own constitutional tradition"
through comparison with other nations' constitutions (p. 116). Such
comparison can also prevent "severe constitutional error" by allowing a
national constitutional court to examine how similar constitutional systems
have dealt with issues such as limited government or freedom of speech.
Finally, by placing themselves within a wider judicial universe, domestic
judges might be better able to engage in "impartial, objective decision-making"
(p. 117).
It is worth noting here the moderate nature of Jackson's position. The
approach serves her well, since she is advocating increased judicial
internationalism from within a country, the United States, where many have an
apparently deep phobia of foreign law. Her reasoning, though admittedly
abstract, is certainly sound. It is difficult to argue with her proposition that the
U.S. Supreme Court should at least be allowed and encouraged to examine
foreign law, even if only to provide empirical information. As Jackson points
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out, if another country like Canada has addressed issues like abortion and
pursued different policies, examining the empirical outcomes of those policies
might assist the U.S. Supreme Court in making its own decisions.
Jackson is also quite systematic in discussing her critics. She
acknowledges the deep concerns of many American theorists with defending
U.S. sovereignty and democratic rule in the face of foreign decisions. Other
theorists suggest that U.S. courts simply lack the expertise necessary to use
foreign decisions effectively, or that other constitutional systems are simply too
different from one another to compare. And there are the ever-present concerns
of originalists and formalists that judicial decisionmaking must conform to
constitutional boundaries.
Jackson answers these concerns by arguing that, since deliberative
engagement only calls for the U.S. Supreme Court to be allowed to consider
foreign sources of law rather than be bound by them, it is difficult to suggest
that engagement will lead to judicial tyranny. It is no more likely that foreign
law will be used to support countermajoritarian positions than majoritarian
ones. The deliberative engagement approach may even be used as a method of
distinguishing domestic law as different from and superior to foreign law.
Foreign law simply provides another lens that judges may use where they feel it
is helpful or appropriate. If judges do not find foreign sources relevant or if
they find that foreign law interferes too much with domestic legal traditions,
they are under no obligation to utilize it. It is here that Jackson's moderate
argument helps her cause, as it requires a supremely cynical view of judges'
goals to believe that merely allowing them the opportunity to consider foreign
sources of law will undermine American democracy.
Jackson does not maintain her moderate approach in the last chapter of
her book, where she broaches the idea of constitutions as "mediators" between
foreign and domestic law. In this section, Jackson goes beyond the more
moderate idea that courts should merely be allowed to consider foreign law.
She suggests that constitutions can also serve as mediators between "the global
and the local (national) communities" by promoting both domestic and
transnational legitimacy (p. 275). While Jackson does not develop this point in
great detail, the idea of constitutions as mediators does not at first glance
appear to fall within a theory of deliberative engagement. Indeed, the idea
seems to fit squarely into the convergence theories, which Jackson argues are
too detached from the domestic concerns of an old democracy like the United
States, with its unique but well-established constitutional traditions. Jackson
therefore could have more clearly enunciated her idea of constitutions as
mediators, since it represents a break with the rest of her argument for
deliberative engagement. Given the extent to which Jackson relies on the
moderate nature of deliberative engagement to refute her critics, she makes a
bold move in advancing a more radical claim in the closing pages of the book,
which would have benefited from more robust development.
The idea of constitutions as transnational mediators aside, Professor
Jackson's book is well argued throughout and is an interesting work for anyone
who wishes to learn about current issues in comparative constitutionalism.
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Jackson's prose is clear and easy to read, though she does occasionally
bombard the reader with lists of issues. But this is the nature of a work that is as
comprehensive as this one, and careful readers are amply rewarded with an
educational introduction to the field of comparative constitutionalism.
Due Process and International Terrorism. By Roza Pati. Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009. Pp. xi, 520. Price: $220.00 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Spencer Gilbert.
The United States and its allies' response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the subsequent prosecution of the War on Terror have
consistently been criticized for displaying a woeful disregard for international
law. Roza Pati's study, Due Process and International Terrorism, gives
substance to some of these criticisms while subtly challenging others. Pati
undertakes a rigorous textual explication of various international human rights
agreements and subsequently compares them with U.S. practice, but she arrives
at few clear conclusions. She discusses the major problems of fighting
international terrorism and preserving due process: domestic surveillance,
detention, trial, torture, and assassination. In her final appraisal, however, Pati
suggests that only those actions that are most clearly beyond the pale of
international standards are likely illegal. In her most provocative (though
subtle) conclusion, Pati argues that even by the stringent due process standards
of various international agreements, trial by military tribunal would not violate
due process per se. Compared to this conclusion, Pati's policy proposals of
balancing liberty and security are familiar and uninspiring. The most valuable
part of her study is its account of post-9/1 1 U.S. policy, but organizational and
stylistic issues hinder what could otherwise be a useful recent history. Pati's
conclusions are limited in scope and few, and they suggest that she is a careful
scholar-perhaps a bit too careful.
Pati begins by describing the peacetime due process protections enshrined
in four major agreements. She focuses primarily on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Her discussion of these treaties is methodical and rich,
exploring the individual guarantees expressed in each document as elaborated
upon by courts applying the agreements. However, this thorough exploration
suffers from the problem that undermines much of the book: an absence of
broader analysis or reflection. Little or no space is given to discussion of the
degree of actual application of the treaty protections or to any comparative
analysis. Pati also offers virtually nothing by way of summation; she ends one
hundred pages of detailed analysis with the beginning of a new section. The
lack of guideposts makes it difficult to link each of her sections into one
conversation or to follow her general line of reasoning. Her discussion of U.S.
domestic due process protections suffers from similar deficiencies of reflection
and summation.
In Chapter IV, Pati focuses on international due process protections in
times of emergency. The ICCPR and ECHR both contain derogation clauses,
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which allow for the suspension of certain rights in time of "emergency which
threatens the life of the nation" (p. 241). Any such derogations must be
reported to the international community and kept in force only as long as
necessary. Pati details all of those rights which cannot be derogated in times of
crisis, but, again, offers nothing conclusive or broadly analytical. The best the
reader can surmise is that the ICCPR would allow very few derogations,
seemingly only for certain procedural rights. The European Court of Human
Rights, interpreting the ECHR derogation clause, has had to confront the issue
much more directly during the conflict arising in Northern Ireland, and in that
case gave Britain broad authority to detain citizens without trial. The perceived
differences between the two agreements, then, may in fact be more an
illustration of the difficulty of evaluating the meaning of international
agreements out of the context of a specific controversy.
The book's greatest contribution is its detailed account of the
antiterrorism measures taken after September 11. Pati's discussion of the
PATRIOT Act, the torture memos, the CIA's "high-value detainee" program,
the push and pull in the courts over habeas corpus, and the use of military
tribunals is a fairly complete introduction to the topic. The section's only real
faults are organizational rather than substantive. For example, she separates the
issues of detention, treatment, and adjudication into different sections, such that
three timelines using the same sources appear back to back to back. The lack of
integration is disorienting and distracts the reader from the material.
Pati's appraisal of U.S. actions in her penultimate chapter finally provides
some analysis of the sources she spends the vast majority of her book detailing.
Pati begins by saying that September 11 arguably represented a public
emergency in which the United States could legally derogate from certain
protections of rights. Pati then attempts to determine whether various U.S.
policies were illegal even in such a state of emergency, alternating between
plausible and rather equivocal conclusions. On detention at Guantanamo and
elsewhere, Pati notes that the prohibition against indefinite, incommunicado
detention is nonderogable under the ICCPR. The Supreme Court's decision in
Boumediene v. Bush reasserted detainees' right to habeas corpus, suggesting
that such detention may no longer violate this prohibition. Targeted
assassination away from the theater of war would violate the nonderogable
right to life and generally "run counter to human rights law" (p. 446). The
argument, however contested, that the theater of war would extend to anywhere
in the world where terrorists hide is not discussed. Torture violates peremptory
norms of international law, though Pati notes that the "lack of adjudication
leaves room for different interpretations of what exactly constitutes torture"
(p.449). However, Pati "takes the stand" that some of the techniques in the
torture memos are indeed torture (p. 450). On the question of trial by military
commission, Pati comes to the conclusion that such trial may afford persons
due process, though they certainly afford fewer safeguards. Her conclusions,
frustrating as some may find them, are all accurate, and highlight the wide
latitude signatories of international agreements have in their interpretation of
international law. From torture to trial, international law leaves the specifics of
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these concepts ill defined. Even by the closest reading and analysis of
international treaties, due process emerges as a much more flexible concept
than many ardent "defenders of international law" might suggest.
Pati has read and summarized an enormous corpus of sources on relevant
international law and recent U.S. history, but has not provided a strong
connection between the two or formed concrete conclusions. The conclusions
and recommendations she does offer are too general to be helpful. Readers may
have been better served if she had simply presented the tough questions
unanswered rather than attempt to provide vague recommendations. Her work
shows a promising attention to detail, but, in the end, seems rather unfinished.
Pati's study is rigorous and never shoots from the hip. She would do well,
however, to make more explicit those provocative thoughts hidden between the
lines. More guidance through the book and explicit conclusions at its end
would help the reader immensely in following her five hundred pages of
thorough research. In its present form, her book contains a useful account of the
American struggle to maintain standards of due process. That account could
make a fine contribution to any course of legal study on terrorism.
Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass
Violence. Edited by Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, with Pierre Hazan.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvi, 345. Price:
$27.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Jane S. Jiang.
In the aftermath of mass violence, what does it mean to establish an
effective system of justice? Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf's Localizing
Transitional Justice answers this question from the discrete perspectives of
nineteen authors, studying instances of postconflict rebuilding across five
continents. The book, as a collection of twelve essays (each constituting one
chapter), provides a rather fragmented picture of how transitional justice should
be approached. It offers no easy answers-when it provides answers at all-
and at its end provides no satisfying and broadly applicable single theory of
intervention. But what this collection lacks in theoretical conclusiveness it
more than makes up for with its compelling sensitivity to the realities of
international intervention's complex and sometimes contradictory nature. The
contributors to this volume generally support the trend toward "localized" and
"culturally appropriate" systems of transitional justice. They also suggest,
importantly, that survivors' needs cannot simply be fulfilled by tailoring an
approach to employ or fit in with local customs, beliefs, and values. By
identifying problems in current conceptualizations of transitional justice, and
by urging shifts in thinking that address these issues, the essays in this volume
seek to encourage both more responsive and more effective approaches to
localized intervention.
Shaw and Waldorf organize the chapters into four parts. Part I, "Frames,"
opens the discussion by examining the theories, stated or implicit, that underpin
conceptions and implementations of transitional justice, as well as the
surrounding historical and critical contexts. These three chapters sketch out the
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general critical and historical contexts of the issues and events discussed in this
broad collection. Part II, "Local Engagements," and Part III, "Power, Politics,
and Priorities," vividly illustrate the ways in which models of transitional
justice from recent history have, despite their best efforts, failed to address the
needs of the recovering local people. Part IV, "Practicing Place-Based Justice,"
argues that successful and meaningful transitional justice requires the correct
and careful consideration of local desires, customs, and history.
The essays are grouped by topic, but as Shaw and Waldorf s introductory
chapter explains, they are also each linked by themes that recur across the parts.
These topics include the problematic tendency of many scholars to divide
theoretical from practical considerations when thinking about transitional
justice, the tension between "victor's justice" and victims' desires for silence
and reconciliation, and the fallacy of defining "appropriate" as "local" and then
"local" as "traditional." Part I's two other chapters are also worth noting. "Stay
the Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities Take Priority?" by Harvey M. Weinstein,
et al. compares recent implementations of transitional justice in the Balkans,
Iraq, Rwanda, and Uganda in order to warn that international norms of justice
and retribution are often not in line with the needs and desires of the local
people. Pierre Hazan's chapter echoes this conclusion, arguing that that in the
aftermath of September 11, "[t]he axioms of [transitional justice], which were
supposed to contribute to the rule of law, foster a human rights culture, promote
national reconciliation, heal trauma, and bring closure, were too often misused"
(p. 49). Hazan finds that the tremors of the Bush administration's "war on
terror" have led to significant changes in the conduct of and reaction to local
conflicts-not only in Afghanistan, but also in places as apparently far-flung as
Uganda, Sudan, Lebanon, and Morocco. The essay offers a fresh and
fascinating look at patterns of change in transitional justice, although its
concluding sentiment-that the age of Obama has ushered away the faults of
recent transitional justice trends-seems premature and weakens the sharp
point of Hazan's argument by drawing it into an unnecessarily facile arc.
In Part II, Fiona C. Ross, Kimberly Theidon, and Rosalind Shaw discuss
the ways in which locals have responded to and sometimes modified
unsatisfying, externally implemented systems of transitional justice. In Chapter
Five, "Histories of Innocence: Postwar Stories in Peru," Theidon interweaves
field studies and theoretical perspectives in approaching truth commissions,
focusing on the "political protagonism" that stems from international
participation in local transitional justice measures. These include the reductive
line-drawing between victim and perpetrator by victim-centric truth
commissions and the continual structural exclusion of the perpetrator groups. In
Chapter Six, "Linking Justice with Reintegration? Ex-Combatants and the
Sierra Leone Experiment," Shaw studies Sierra Leone's "Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration" (p. 112) policies, which tackle head-on the
problem of reintroducing perpetrators into postconflict communities. She
concludes that because the reintegration policies favor educated and elite ex-
combatants, the policies actually exacerbate the marginalization experienced by
the mass of low-status ex-combatants. Shaw urges transitional justice
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mechanisms to go "beyond narrow concepts of justice that derive from criminal
law" and seek norms for reintegration from community members themselves,
who favor behaviors that are beneficial to the community and perceived as
conciliatory, such as "humility, hard work, and sobriety" (p. 131).
Part III further attests to the gap between the goals of various
governmental or international transitional justice programs and those of the
communities and individuals that the programs intend to serve, and suggests
that the discrepancy not only exists, but is widespread. In Chapter Seven,
"Reconciliation Grown Bitter? War, Retribution, and Ritual Action in Northern
Uganda," Sverker Finnstrom identifies a deep-seated and persistent structural
inequality in the International Criminal Court's (ICC) intervention during the
brief period of peace talks and ceasefire from 2006 to 2008. Finnstrom argues
that by prioritizing international ideals of retributive justice over local desires
for a third-party facilitator of dialogue and reconciliation, the ICC has failed to
"really tune in to [the] flexibility of ever-changing meanings and local social
realities," and to meet local goals of encouraging "social solidarity" (p. 154).
Finnstrdm notes that in the recent past, the Acholi people in Uganda have
turned instead to ritual action in order to effect the sorts of social
reconciliations they desire. In Chapter Eight, Ann Nee and Peter Uvin find a
similar turn toward traditional social justice institutions in Burundi, where local
reluctance to comply with "the international normative enterprise of transitional
justice" (p. 160)-especially criminal and retributive justice-has been
accompanied by a resurgence of support for bashingantahe, locally invested or
elected mediators. Nee and Uvin's chapter implies a slender hope that locally
responsive, community-rooted, and community-oriented mechanisms of
transitional justice can be integrated with the interstate actors that command the
resources and support of the global community; the bashingantahe system and
the "well-received" local workshops seem to have benefited from the
involvement of NGOs, religious organizations, and even the United Nations.
But in the concluding chapter of Part III, Lars Waldorf examines gacaca courts
in Rwanda to warn that involving government or interstate actors in local
initiatives brings dangers of its own. After surveying the history and
development of gacaca inkiko courts (formalized community courts developed
under government auspices from a preexisting local system of ad-hoc dispute
resolution), Waldorf focuses on the generally disregarded but increasingly
vocal criticisms of the gacaca system by on-the-ground local organizations and
NGOs. He argues that gacaca courts fail to be truly responsive to local needs.
Although they appear to resist the usual paradigms of transitional justice, the
courts do not actually represent a meaningful rethinking of its central, Western-
justice-oriented tenets. At the same time, the consistency of gacaca inkiko with
international norms has made it enormously successful in gaining the support
of donors and interstate actors, diverting attention and resources from smaller
and perhaps more deserving projects.
Part IV shifts the focus to methods of reshaping transitional justice
practices, particularly in Ron Dudai and Hillel Cohen's Chapter Eleven,
"Dealing with the Past when the Conflict is Still Present." This chapter focuses
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on the role of local initiatives in truth-seeking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Describing a number of local organizations and initiatives that seek to reach
beyond the usual divide of self-victimizing or -excusing while vilifying others,
Dudai and Cohen identify the organizations' pursuit of a multifarious truth or
history as a significant step toward cultural rebuilding in the wake of-or the
midst of-tension and violence. This emphasis on a diversity of viewpoints and
a longer-term approach to reconciliation is also at the heart of Part IV's final
chapter, "Local Transitional Justice Practice in Pretransition Burma." Here,
Patrick Falvey examines Burma's conflict history (unusual in being driven both
by authoritarian repression and by interethnic land and resource disputes) to
deal frankly with the tension between the priorities of international methods
and actors on the one hand and those of the affected peoples on the other. He
lands unrepentantly on the side of the locals.
For all its protestations of balancing international needs with local ones,
this book as a whole speaks for the side of the locals with no more hesitation
than Falvey's chapter. The essays in Localizing Transitional Justice seem to
implicitly agree that the desires of the local people for modes of justice that
promote reintegration and rebuilding are more important than international
norms of retributive justice. But why should local desires take priority? To the
extent that this question goes largely unanswered, this book runs the risk of
slipping by its intended audience-those with the power to influence the
interstate actors who govern mechanisms of transitional justice-without
persuasively engaging the deeper disagreement at hand. There also seems to
exist a fundamental difference in judicial values that is not part of the explicit
dialogue on transitional justice, which this volume does not address either.
Underlying the opinions of those who support greater sensitivity to local needs
is the belief that justice must serve the expressed desires of the people and
communities in which it works. But for those who subscribe to the much-
maligned external impositions of retributive, criminally oriented justice, what is
normatively, universally right and what is convenient for social rebuilding are
different things.
Moses Chrispus Okello's thoughtful and considered Afterword aspires to
fill this gap. While Okello does not make a conclusive case for the anti-
universalist stance of this book, he does raise important objections to the idea
that one paradigm of justice and ethics exists that can be correctly applied with
the same result to all situations by all people. Okello wonders if universalism is
not predicated on an unspoken belief that all actors, regardless of history,
culture, and level of current development, are "progressing toward the same
destination" (p. 279). Okello also points out that even within their own
framework, those who favor normative international standards of justice often
interpret the same moral issue differently in varying circumstances. Focusing
on several African countries' recent experiences with transitional justice,
Okello challenges the tenets of universalism in the same way that the rest of the
volume challenges current practices of transitional justice. And like the rest of
the volume, he offers no firm answers, but suggests directions of future
development and inquiry.
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While this volume does not resolve itself neatly into a single, tightly
unified answer, its parting questions are not the unfocused inconclusiveness of
sloppy scholarship. On the contrary, as Ruti Teitel writes in the Preface, the
book "[poses] fundamental questions . .. which are as much moral as legal and
political, . . . shed[ding] light far beyond transitions" (p. viii).

